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Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Virus: Containment Level and Case
Fatality Ratio
T
helifesciences,andtheﬁeldofmicrobiologyinparticular,are
in the midst of an unprecedented debate regarding the risks
posed by the publication of two studies that report the generation
of mammalian-transmissible H5N1 virus in the laboratory. The
controversy was precipitated when the National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) advised the U.S. government that
thebestcourseofactionwastoseekaredactionofthemanuscripts
to delete important details that could be used for nefarious pur-
poses (1, 2). In a recent issue, mBio published pro- and anti-
NSABB decision commentaries (3–6) with the goal of informing
the debate and the hope that airing these views would lead to the
best decisions. At the time of this writing the issue remains unset-
tled, and a ﬁerce debate is raging in government and academic
circlesonthebestcourseofaction.Evenwiththequestionofhow
to publish these studies unsettled, two other issues have quickly
emerged: (i) the appropriate biosafety containment level (BSL) to
be used for studies with mammalian-transmissible H5N1 viruses
and (ii) the case fatality ratio of human H5N1 infections.
The question of the appropriate level of containment is both a
biosafety and a biosecurity issue. Although “biosafety” and “bio-
security” are sometimes used interchangeably, it is important to
recognize that they denote very different concerns (7). The exis-
tence of mammalian-transmissible H5N1 immediately brings
about the question of whether the current biosafety level of con-
tainment is adequate. Currently, studies with mammalian-
transmissible H5N1 are being done at BSL3 or higher (8). How-
ever, Canada has already moved to institute the highest level of
biosafety containment for research work involving mammalian-
transmissible H5N1 virus (see http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/lab
-bio/res/advi-avis/sbn-asb-2012-01-31-eng.php). It is important
to understand that the choice of BSL has profound implications
for society. BSL4 containment would theoretically protect society
by increasing both biosafety and biosecurity. However, at the
sametime,thisveryhighlevelofcontainmentwouldmakesociety
potentially more vulnerable, since critical experimental work will
notgetdonesimplybecauseBSL4facilitiesarefewinnumberand
already engaged in research with numerous other pathogens.
Hence, no matter what decision is made, we face a tradeoff with
regards to safety and future preparedness. There is also the possi-
bility that assigning mammalian-transmissible H5N1 to BSL4
containmentwouldaffectvaccineproductiongiventhatthephar-
maceutical vaccine industry may not have such facilities and/or
choose not to take vaccine projects under such restrictions. The
more stringent containment conditions could also deter the re-
cruitmentofinvestigatorstothisﬁeldandthushinderfuturepre-
paredness. On the other hand, maintaining the current BSL3
regulationswouldallowmuchoftheongoingresearchtoproceed
unhindered but at higher risk for accidental releases. Given the
importance of the containment issue for biosafety, biosecurity,
and future preparedness against inﬂuenza, we have invited two
setsofinvestigatorstodiscusstheproandconargumentsforeach
containment level (8, 9).
At the heart of the controversies on the disposition of the two
manuscripts and the containment issue is the presumed case fa-
talityratioofhumanH5N1infection.Clearly,muchofthedebate
is driven by the concern that any H5N1 pandemic would be ac-
companied by unacceptable mortality and morbidity, although
estimates of expected mortality differ widely. Whereas clinically
documentedcasesofH5N1infectioninhumanshaveacasefatal-
ity ratio of 50 to 60%, this number has been questioned on the
groundsthatmanyinfectionsaresubclinical(10).Ameta-analysis
of case fatality has also argued for a signiﬁcantly lower mortality
rate for H5N1 infection in humans (11). In contrast, an article in
mBiobyOsterholmandKelleyarguesthattheonlyknownreliable
mortalitynumbersarethoseprovidedbytheWorldHealthOrga-
nization, which show a mortality rate of 59% for humans with
documentedH5N1infection(12).Furthermore,theseauthorsar-
gue that current global countermeasures in the form of vaccines
and antiviral drugs are inadequate for coping with an H5N1 pan-
demic.
One area of agreement between the two camps is the need for
more information on all aspects of H5N1 biology, pathogenesis,
and epidemiology. In essence, the debate on the case fatality ratio
is really a debate on the value of the epidemiology tools used to
deﬁne and discriminate between infection and disease. Hence, no
matter what choices are made regarding containment level, we
urge that great consideration be given to protecting the inﬂuenza
research enterprise, since increased knowledge is critical for the
defense against future pandemics. If BSL4 containment is indeed
mandated for studies of virulent mammalian-transmissible
H5N1, then we urge that low-virulence strains be identiﬁed that
would permit much of the work at current facilities that have
accesstoBSL3containmenttocontinue.Protectionagainstcur-
rent and future inﬂuenza threats is critically dependent on a vig-
orous research environment that can produce new vaccines and
provide new understanding of viral pathogenesis that can lead to
better therapies. We know from experience with select agent reg-
ulations that as research is made more difﬁcult, less work is done
(7). On the other hand, we know that when researchers can carry
out basic studies with attenuated strains much work can be done
unencumbered. For example, in the case of Bacillus anthracis, ap-
proximatelytentimesasmanypapershavebeenpublishedonthe
anthrax toxin relative to its capsule, a discrepancy that has been
attributed to the fact that attenuated toxin-producing capsule-
deﬁcient strains are available for study in BSL2 containment out-
side the select agent regulations (7). In contrast, all work with
encapsulated B. anthracis strains must be done under select agent
rules.
For the H5N1 and inﬂuenza ﬁeld in general, we urge that the
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